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With some probability a country will find it infeasible to honor its international
obligations. If the probability distribution of that feasibility depends on unobservable
aspects of the country's economic policy, the moral hazard present requires the
imposition of an incentive-compatibility constraint on the design of debt-restructuring
agreements. In this paper we discuss the implications of such a constraint for the design
of a Pareto-optimal agreement.
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Governments of developing countries and their foreign creditors have recently agreed,
assisted by the International Monetary Fund, to several restructurings of sovereign-debt.
These agreements essentially consist of two conditions: i) a repayment schedule, and ii) an
adjustment policy. The repayment schedule is the intertemporal sequence of net transfers
of resources between the country and its international creditors. The adjustment policy is
the set of actions designed to make it feasible for the country to transfer resources to its
creditors.'
When the scheduled net flow of foreign financing is negative, (when the foreign debt
must be serviced or repaid), there is a possibility of default. This can be either formal,
when the country refuses to pay, or de facto, when the country finds it infeasible to pay.
Most of the literature on international debt has dealt with the first form of default:
the refusal to pay. In particular, the literature on debt repudiation has emphasized the
limits imposed on a country's ability to borrow abroad by the absence of an international
authority capable of enforcing payments across sovereign borders.2 In this paper, we deal
with the second type of default: when with some probability the country will find it
infeasible to honor its obligations.
This paper draws from my Ph. D. dissertation at The University of Chicago. I thank the members of
my dissertation committee, Michael Mussa (chairman), Jacob Frenkel, and Larry Sjaastad, for their advice
and encouragement. I also thank, for their helpful comments at different stages of this work, Jorge Avila,
Theodore Bergstrom, Alan Deardorff, Roger Gordon, John Laitner, Pablo Guidotti, Robert Stern, Robert
Townsend, and seminar participants at the universities of Colorado-.Boulder, Chicago, and Michigan, and
at the VI Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society.
1 A payment is feasible when the debtor has an asset or a commodity acceptable to the creditor as a
means of payment.
2 See for example Eaton and Gersovits(1981), Sachs and Cohen(1983), Sachs(1983) and Almansi(1986b).
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When the feasibility of international transfers of resources is entirely random, the design
of a debt-restructuring agreement is a rather simple problem. In general, however, the
probability distribution of feasible transfers depends on the economic policy pursued by the
country. This explains the need for stipulating an adjustment policy within a foreign debt-
restructuring agreement. Moreover, if the creditors have a limited ability to monitor policy
actions, the problem becomes considerably more difficult because of the moral hazard
present in the choice of those actions.
There is evidence suggesting significant asymmetric information in debt-restructuring
negotiations.3 For example, the set of easily measurable economic indicators used by the
International Monetary Fund in its stand-by lending, and its efforts to develop the tech-
nique of "enhanced surveillance," reveal the Fund's limited monitoring capabilities. The
recent initiative by international banks of creating the Institute of International Finance
Inc. is also an indication of concern about the limited information available to creditors.
Under asymmetric information, only the country's self-interest can insure the honoring
of policy provisions. Therefore, to make individually rational for the country to honor the
policy provisions, we must impose an incentive-compatibility constraint on the design of
restructuring agreements. In this paper we discuss the implications of such a constraint
for the design of a Pareto-optimal agreement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our primary assumptions. Sec-
tion III presents the model we use in the subsequent analysis. Section IV characterizes the
properties of an optimal agreement under moral hazard. Section V investigates the impli-
cations of the adjustment policy choice for the design of the optimal repayment schedule.
Finally, Section VI discusses the policy implications of our analysis and closes the paper
with some concluding remarks.
2. Primary Assumptions
We base our analysis on the following three assumptions:
3 See Watson et al.(1986).
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Assumption 1. The only link between the country and the international capital market is
the current group of foreign creditors. To internalize the incentive-effects of their lending,
the creditors negotiate with the country's authorities through a centralized agency.
Assumption 2. Whatever the nature of the bargaining process, its outcome is Pareto-
efficient. There is no other agreement which gives the country a higher expected welfare
and also repays the debt in terms consistent with the creditors's preferences.
Assumption 3. To highlight the implications of the incentive-compatibility constraint,
we assume away the problem of enforcing commitments to execute observable actions.
The country will honor both the state-contingent repayment schedule and the observable
aspects of the agreed policy choice.
3. The Model
The simplest structure we can use to discuss the design of an optimal debt-restructuring
agreement is a two-period model. This setting describes the present, when the agreement
is negotiated, and the future, when the country repays the debt.
Let st = (yt, et) be the state of nature in period t, t = 0, 1, where yt is the country's ag-
gregate income, and e the maximum feasible payment. Assume that the parties negotiate
the agreement after the current state of nature realizes and everyone observes it.
Let ' be the repayment schedule. By risk-sharing considerations, an exclusive and
Pareto-efficient agreement between the country and its foreign creditors requires a state-
contingent repayment schedule.' Since we have uncertainty only about the future realiza-
tion of the state of nature, we write the repayment schedule as 0 = {0o, 4i(s)}.
The repayment schedule must be feasible. We represent this fact with the feasibility
constraints 4ko (o and 41 _ 1
Let B E 0 be a vector contained in the finite set of available adjustment policies,9.
There is an underlying macroeconomic model that generates a joint probability distribution
' A state-contingent repayment schedule implies that the creditors will write-off their loans in certain
states of nature. We do not observe that kind of contingency formally included in actual debt-restructuring
agreements. If these restructurings are optimal, however, the state-contingency must be part of an implicit
understanding, as in the implicit contracts of Azariadis(1975).
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function, P(y, a 98), of aggregate income and the maximum feasible international payment,
conditional on the vector of policy parameters 9. We denote the probability mass function
as p(y,' 9|e).
The discrete random variables y and a can take any value in the finite set S = Y x
We assume that S is independent of 06
Given the agreed-upon payment schedule, (, present consumption is co = yo - co, and
future consumption, contingent on state s E S, is ci(s) = yi - 01(s). The strictly concave
utility function u(ct) represents the country's preferences over different consumption levels
both in the present and the future.
Conditional on a particular policy choice, 9, and repayment schedule, §, the country's
expected utility over the entire repayment horizon is defined by the following equation:
U(Z,90) = u(co) +,8Z u(ci(s))p(s | 9)
Y S
where # E (0, 1) is the intertemporal-preference discount factor.
To highlight the effects of the incentive problems on the optimal repayment schedule,
we assume that the creditors are risk neutral. Given the adjustment policy, 9, and the
repayment schedule, 4, the creditors's expected utility is the present value of the expected
payments:
V (4,90) = 40o+ 6ZZ i(s)p(s 10)
Y 5
where 6 E (0,1) is the creditors's discount factor.6
For illustrative purposes, it is useful to discuss briefly the properties of the optimal debt-
restructuring agreement under symmetric information. Since we assume that the country
is risk averse and that the creditors are risk neutral, the solution is trivial. There are two
possibilities:i)an interior solution, and ii)a boundary solution. In an interior solution the
feasibility constraints are not binding. Hence, the creditors allow the country to enjoy a
a This means that the adjustment policy determines the probability assigned to each possible event, but
it does no.t determine which events are possible.
8 Note that in computing U(Z, 0) and V(4, 0) we use the same joint probability distribution: we assume
homogeneous beliefs about the effects of the adjustment policy on the state of the economy. The case of
heterogeneous beliefs is discussed in Almansi(1986a).
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state-independent consumption flow, taking for themselves the income risk.7 In a boundary
solution the optimal payment equals the maximum feasible payment in at least one state of
nature. This, of course, implies a departure from the risk-sharing agreement which would
be optimal considering only the assumed attitudes towards risk. It is optimal, however,
given that payments must satisfy'the feasibility constraints.
4. The Design Problem under Moral Hazard
There is moral hazard in a debt-restructuring agreement when a government must
undertake an unobservable policy action that, given the agreed repayment schedule 4,
it does not perceive as maximizing the country's expected welfare. Since the only way
to enforce an unobservable policy choice is to make it self-enforcing, we must include
incentive-compatibility constraints in the description of our problem.8
Definition 1. Policy 0, E 0 is incentive-compatible with the repayment schedule Q if
U(D, 6,) > U(4, 6) VO E G.
We can describe the design of an optimal restructuring agreement between a country
and its creditors as solving a sequence of two problems. These are Problems 1 and 2 below.
Problem 1. For every e, E 0, maximize U(',0,) with respect to 4, subject to:
V(0,6,) R (1)
40 5 fo,di(s) < (Vs E S (2)
U(0,e6,) U(4,6)v6 E 0 (3)
where (1) is the repayment constraint, which says that the expected payment must be
greater than or equal to the debt to be repaid, R; (2) are the feasibility constraints, which
say that the optimal payment in every period and in every state of nature must be smaller
i Michael Mussa interpreted this result as if the creditors "buy the country." This is what would happen
if the country were to offer, and the creditors to accept, titles to domestic real assets as repayment, thus
transforming debt in direct investment: a debt-equity swap.
8 We borrow heavily from the principal-agent literature. See for example Grossman and Hart(1983),
Hart(1983), and Holmstrom(1979). For a survey see Arrow(1985).
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than or equal to the maximum feasible payment in that period and that state; and (3) is
the incentive-compatibility constraint just defined.
Let 1(8,) denote the solution to Problem 1. This solution, if it exists, gives the Pareto
optimal risk-sharing rule when the country must implement policy 6,, and that implemen-
tation is incentive-compatible. Of course, such a solution may not exist.' Let e* be the
subset of adjustment policies for which a solution to Problem 1 exists. We call the policies
contained in 0* implementable. The final step in the optimal design problem is to choose
the best among them. This is Problem 2 below.
Problem 2. Maximize U('(0,),0,) with respect to 0,, subject to , E E*.
The Optimal Agreement
To simplify the characterization of the optimal agreement, we reduce the set of available
adjustment policies to just two alternatives. The gains in clarity and tractability outweigh
the loss of generality.
Let 0 = {1,02} be the set of alternative policy choices, and assume we want to
implement policy 61. To characterize the optimal repayment schedule when the agreement
requires the implementation of policy 01, we construct the Lagrangian for Problem 1. Let A
be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the repayment constraint, yo and pi(s)Vs E S
the multipliers associated with the feasibility constraints, and r the multiplier associated
with the incentive compatibility constraint. Hence, we have:
L(4,8 1 ) = U(', 8 1 ) + A[V(0,0 1) - RI
+Mo[eo - 0o]+ZZ 1(s)(&(s) - 4(s)]
Y 8
+r[U((,61) -- U(D,0 2)]
If a solution exists, it can be characterized by the first order conditions obtained by dif-
ferentiation of the Lagrangian with respect to '1. Assuming that the incentive-compatibility
constraints are binding, the first order conditions are:
* For R large enough there may be no policy that can make feasible the repayment. If there are
some policies that would satisfy the feasibility constraints, there may be no way of making these policies
incentive-compatible.
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u'(yo - 4o) <A, ao - do >0,
with complementary slackness, and
pu'(y- (s))[1+ r(1 - p(s 1 92)/p(s j 01))] AS, i(S) - 4(s) > 0,Vs E S,
with complementary slackness.
Proposition 1 states a fundamental property of interior solutions to Problem 1, (i.e.,
when the feasibility constraints are not binding).
Proposition 1. If the incentive-compatibility constraints are binding, then a first-best
Pareto optimal risk-sharing rule is unattainable.
Whenever p(s | 61) differs from p(s 1 02) the optimal risk-sharing rule will not only be
affected by the risk aversion of debtors and creditors, but also by the stochastic behavior of
the economy under both the adjustment policy to be implemented and its alternative. This
means that the constraint imposed by the presence of moral hazard due to asymmetric
information reduces the extent of risk-sharing between the country and its foreign creditors.
Consequently, we obtain a second-best Pareto-optimal risk-sharing rule.
In boundary solutions, that is, when the feasibility constraints are binding, the optimal
payment equals the maximum feasible payment. This obviously implies that the optimal
payment does not depend on incentive considerations. Hence, the more states there are
with payments at the boundary, the less ability the creditors have to affect the country's
incentives.
To investigate how incentive considerations affect the design of the optimal repayment
schedule, we need to describe the information provided by the realization of a particular
state of nature. The following definition provides the required description.
Definition 2. State s' = (y', (') E S is better news than state s" = (y", c") E S if
p(s' I 62) /P(s' | 01) i p(s" | 6 2) /P(8" j 01)
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Bayes theorem provides a natural interpretation for this definition. Let 7r(6 1) and ir(62 )
be arbitrary prior probability beliefs about which policy, 61 or 62, has been undertaken. By
Bayes theorem p(s j 6,)r(6p) = ir(p I s)p(s), where r(6, | s) is the posterior probability
that policy 6,,p = 1,2, has been undertaken, once state s E S has been observed, and
p(s) = E,ee p(s 1 6,). Then, if s' is better news than s", we have:
1(62 I s')/r(G1 | s') ; (62 |Is")/r(1I | a")
This means that no matter what the original beliefs were, we will be more confident
that. policy 61 has in fact been undertaken after observing s' than after observing s".10
Using the definition of better news, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the feasibility constraints are not binding for states s' E S and s" E S,
and state s' is better news than s", then consumption under s' will be higher than under
s".
Proposition 2 follows immediately from the first order conditions of Problem 1. It says
that the country should receive better treatment from its creditors, the better the evidence
in favor of the hypothesis that the adjustment policy established by the agreement has in
fact been undertaken.
5. Policy Choice and Optimal Repayment
The next step in the analysis is to use the basic information provided by Proposition
2 to predict the shape of the optimal repayment schedule, <b, given the characteristics of
the particular adjustment policy to be implemented.
- Let h(s) = p(s | 6 2)/p(s | 18). Since the lower the value of h(s), the better the
news provided by . E 5, it follows from Proposition 2 that consumption is decreasing
in h(s). Given that 4s) = y- c(s), if we can predict consumption, c(s), we can also
predict the optimal payment, 4(s). Therefore, we only need to concentrate our attention
on the functional relationship between the likelihood ratio h(s) and the state of nature
s. As we established earlier, the relationship between h(s) and s = (y, () depends on the
10 See Milgrom(1981).
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information provided by particular realizations of s. That information depends in turn on
our knowledge about the probability distribution of states of nature generated by both the
policy we want to implement, 01, and the alternative policy, 02.
The following definitions provide a criterion to organize our knowledge about those
probability distributions. The criterion is based on the concept of first-order stochastic
dominance."I
Definition 3. Adjustment policy 01 is more effective than 02, (denoted by 01 MET 02),
if for any y * E Y we have , p(y*,zx 181) E 5.p(y*, z 062 ),V . E 2.
We define an adjustment policy to be more effective than another if the probability
of a maximum feasible payment smaller than an arbitrary E 2, occurring, is smaller
under the former policy than under the latter one. Similarly, we characterize the effects of
different adjustment policies on the country's national income with the following definition.
Definition 4. Adjustment policy 01 is more recessive than policy 82, (denoted by 81 MRT
02), if for any * E 2 we have Ej< , p(x, (* j 2) < Ey, p(z, * 1),Vy. E Y.
To simplify the subsequent analysis, we assume that h(s) = h(y, e) is monotonic in
y and (. The following Lemmas describe the relationship between h(s) and the state of
nature.
Lemma 1. If h(y, ) is monotonic in (, and 01 is more (less) effective than 02, then h(y, E)
is nonincreasing (nondecreasing) in (V(y, C) E S.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., Ahia> 0.12 Since 01 is more effective than 02, we have:
p(y, z |81) < p(y, X z ),V(. E E or [h(y, z) - 1}p(y, zx|161) ;> 0, V * E 8.
Since h is monotonic in (, and we have assumed AhA? > 0, there exists a * E 2, such
that h(y, () < 1V( < (*. Then,
~j[h(y, z) - 1}p(y, z I 01) <_ 0,
11 See Lippmnan and McCall(1981).
12 Hereafter, the notation AyAz represents the product of the first differences of the variables y and z,
i.e., Ay Az = ('- y('- z).
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a contradiction. I
Lemma 2. If h(y, () is monotonic in y, and 01 is more (less) recessive than 82, then h is
nondecreasing (nonincreasing) in y, V(y, E) E S.
Proof. By same argument that in Lemma 1. 1
Using the results of Lemmas 1 and 2, we construct Table 1 summarizing the predicted
relationship of h with y and e.
Table 1. Relationship of h with y and a under Moral Hazard
policies 01 MRT 02 02 MRT 01
8 1 METO2  Ahty>QAhAd0 O Ahoy<0 AhA 0
62 MET 1  AhAy>0AhA 0O Ahoy 0AhAd 0
Recalling that c(y, e) = y - 0(y, e), and that consumption is decreasing in h, we can
use the results of Table 1 to predict the relationship of I with y and E. Table 2 presents
the results.
Table 2. The Optimal Payment Under Moral Hazard
policies 01 MRT 02 02 MRT 0i
1METO2  A4 Ay A4A( 0 A :5y AkA <0
62 MET 1  AO Ay AA4 20 AO 5Ay AOA >0
The interpretation of Table 2 is straightforward. For example, suppose that the policy
we want to implement, 01, is more effective and more recessive than the alternative, 02.
Since 81 is more effective than 02, a high feasible-payment realization is better news than
a low one. Then, for a given national income, a high feasible-payment realization must
be rewarded by allowing greater consumption than under a low realization. This means
that, for a given y, the optimal payment ZA is decreasing in . Similarly, since 01 is
more recessive than 02, a low national-income realization is better news than a high one.
Then, for a given maximum feasible payment, a high national-income realization must be
penalized by allowing lower consumption than under a low realization. This means that,
for a given (, the optimal payment & is increasing in y. Moreover, to reduce aggregate
10
consumption, the increase in the optimal payment must be greater than the increase in
national income.
6. Policy implications and Concluding Remarks
Our analysis shows that asymmetric information about policy actions introduces severe
constraints in the design of a Pareto-optimal debt-restructuring agreement. In particular,
the repayment schedule must give the country's policymakers the right incentives for policy
choice.
The results presented in Table 2 suggest how difficult it could be to find the optimal
adjustment policy. For example, to implement the most effective adjustment policy the
repayment must be decreasing in the magnitude of the adjustment (our variable (). The
purpose of the adjustment policy, however, is to make it feasible the repayment. If a
succesful adjustment must be rewarded by writing-off the debt, then it is unlikely that
the debt can be repaid. Perhaps this explains why the International Monetary Fund has
accepted relatively heterodox adjustment programs in the last few years.
The results of the analysis also offer an explanation for the typically recessive nature of
standard adjustment programs. Consider the repayment schedule that would implement
an expansionary policy. According to our results, all evidence against the hypothesis that
the expansionary policy has been undertaken must be penalized, and all evidence in favor
of it must be rewarded. Evidence against an expansionary policy, however, is a recession,
and evidence in favor of it is an expansion. Thus, the repayment must be decreasing
in income. An optimal agreement, however, contains an element of risk-sharing. To
implement the expansionary policy the repayment schedule would have to increase the
variability of consumption, thus providing no risk-sharing.
Finally, consider the implications of our analysis for the kind of relationship that
sovereign states and international banks can be expected to develop. The developing
countries's lack of free access to credit is currently seen as one of the main problems af-
fecting the international financial system.'3 If asymmetric information of the sort we have
considered here is indeed an important problem, then a return to free access is a hopeless
'See for example Watson et al. (1986).
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prospect. The need to internalize the incentive effects of sovereign lending should tend
to maintain the current situation. This should also consolidate the observed trend to the
concentration of lending in just a few large international banks. In this context, the role
of the International Monetary Fund can only be expected to evolve in the direction of
becoming an information and coordination agency rather than an alternative source of
funds for its members.
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